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Coping with a big nuclear accident 
 
Society's extensive figurative vocabulary of nuclear terms demonstrates just how far 
atomic energy has permeated the public's consciousness and imagination, in a way 
matched by few other scientific discoveries.  Hence we can understand perfectly well 
a news report saying that the stock market has had a "meltdown" and we grasp 
immediately that the political "fallout" could be significant if the number of firms 
affected has reached a "critical mass".  But how do we cope when an actual nuclear 
reactor melts down and deposits a significant amount of radioactive fallout over the 
surrounding area?  Exactly this happened at Chernobyl in April 1986, where to make 
matters worse, the reactor went super prompt critical for a few seconds
1
, depositing a 
large amount of additional heat into the core.  A quarter of a century later, another 
very large radioactive release occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power 
station. Here the operating reactors were shut down as soon as the Tohoku Earthquake 
was detected but the tsunami following on close behind knocked out the reactor 
cooling system.  The overheated fuel assemblies then reacted with steam to produce 
hydrogen gas, which led to explosions in the reactor buildings and the release of 
radionuclides into the environment. 
 
In both cases, the authorities' principal response for protecting the public was to move 
large numbers of people away from the surrounding area.  A total of 335,000 were 
relocated after Chernobyl, never to return.  Meanwhile after the accident at 
Fukushima Daiichi, 111,000 people were required to leave areas declared as restricted 
and an additional 49,000 joined the exodus voluntarily; about 85,000 had not returned 
to their homes by 2015.  Were these sensible policy reactions?  Was there an 
alternative?  How should we respond to a big nuclear accident in the future?  These 
were the questions behind the multi-university NREFS research study – Management 
of Risk Issues: Environmental, Financial and Safety – carried out for the Engineering 
and Physical Sciences Research Council as part of the UK-India Civil Nuclear Power 
Collaboration (NREFS, 2015).  This Special Issue carries the 10 closing papers from 
that project. 
 
The NREFS approach is predominantly quantitative, and Thomas (2017a) outlines the 
methods used and the results obtained, and recommends such mathematically based 
methods as aids to penetrating the fog of uncertainty and confusion following a major 
nuclear accident.  They should, Thomas suggests, provide the basis for making 
decisions that will do more good than harm.  He calls for the demystification of 
nuclear accidents and specifically for decision makers to be aware in advance that 
they should not adopt blindly the strategies used to manage past severe nuclear 
accidents. Using available data on the health consequences of the two severe nuclear 
events discussed above, the NREFS project has shown these strategies to be excessive 
in view of the actual, as opposed to feared, level of radiological risk faced by the 
public. 
 
Waddington et al. (2017a) find that the numbers relocated after both the Chernobyl 
and Fukushima Daiichi accidents were very much too high.  (They use the term 
                                                 
1 Super prompt critical means that the reaction was sustained and could grow using prompt neutrons 
only.  The increased fission rate could be maintained for only a few seconds, however, before the high 
temperature induced in the core caused its reactivity to drop and the reaction to shut down 
automatically (the Nordheim-Fuchs effect).  The disrupted core then stayed subcritical and shut down. 
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"relocation" to imply that the people concerned will live away from a designated 
exclusion zone for a substantial period of time, after which return to the original 
location starts to become problematical.)  Based on the Judgement- or J-value method, 
between 5 and 10 times too many people were moved away from the Chernobyl area 
between 1986 and 1990, and the authors find it difficult to justify moving anyone 
away from Fukushima Daiichi on grounds of radiological protection.  The analysis is 
retrospective, and so blame is not apportioned to the authorities concerned.  However, 
the authors suggest that it should be taken into account in future decision making. 
They go further and suggest that more comprehensive radiological data collection 
could be fed ‘on the fly’ into the analysis during an accident to assess the potential 
effectiveness of candidate decisions.  Some thought-provoking comparative statistics 
on life expectancy are also provided between the Chernobyl region after the world's 
worst nuclear accident and the UK in the 21
st
 century.  The authors suggest that the 
900 people most under threat from radiation if they had not moved out in the 2
nd
 
relocation from Chernobyl in 1990 would have lost just 3 months' life expectancy if 
they had stayed in situ.   Meanwhile the 6,800 people who faced the highest radiation 
dose, had they not been moved out in the 1
st
 Chernobyl evacuation of 1986, would 
have lost 3 years or more of life expectancy, with 5.6 years constituting the average 
reduction.  These numbers are then compared with  
• the 4½ months life expectancy lost by the average Londoner to air pollution;  
• the 3¼ years difference in life expectancy between the average person living 
in Harrow, North London and his/her counterpart in Manchester; and  
• the 8.6 years of life that baby boys born in Blackpool lose compared with 
those born in London's Kensington and Chelsea.   
 
The J-value is a new approach (validated for 90% of the world's nations during the 
course of the NREFS study) that balances safety spending against the extension of life 
expectancy it brings about.  It improves on currently used methods by introducing 
greater objectivity as a result of its incorporation of the life-quality index (Nathwani 
and Lind, 1997) at its core.  This allows the monetisation of future years of life using 
GDP per head plus an appropriate value of risk-aversion (Thomas, 2016, gives a 
discussion of risk-aversion and its development as an economic parameter over the 
past 300 years).  The J-value is found by dividing the actual cost of the safety measure 
by the maximum that can be spent before life quality declines, implying that the 
expenditure is justified when J is less than 1.0.  The J-value possesses the 
considerable advantage in the nuclear context that, unlike other approaches, it allows 
loss of life both in the short and in the long term (as a result of radiation exposure, for 
example) to be measured on the same scale.   
 
The broad thrust of the J-value findings is backed up by two other NREFS studies that 
employed different and diverse assessment methods.  Yumashev et al. (2017) apply 
Bellman's principle of optimality to determine the best decisions to be taken after a 
large range of big nuclear accidents.  They find relocation not to be a sensible policy 
measure in any of the hundreds of base case scenarios they examined; it is rarely 
optimal in any of their sensitivity cases.  See also Yumashev and Johnson (2017).  
Meanwhile, after carrying out a review of current UK planning for a big nuclear 
accident (Ashley et al., 2017a), Ashley et al. (2017b) examine, using Public Health 
England's PACE-COCO2 program suite, the likely effects on the public of a severe 
accident on a fictional nuclear reactor located on the South Downs of England.  Even 
after applying a rather strict safe-return criterion, they find that the expected number 
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of people needing to be relocated is only 620, orders of magnitude below the figures 
for Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi.   
 
By contrast with relocation, the J-value method provides strong support for 
remediation after a big nuclear accident (Waddington et al., 2017b).  Similarly, 
remediation and temporary food bans are quite likely to be components of an optimal 
economic strategy (Yumashev et. al., 2017).  Meanwhile PACE-COCO2 (Ashley et 
al., 2017b) quantifies the expected cost of lost agricultural production as £130M, 
within an overall total expected accident cost of £800M (excluding reactor damage 
and lost electricity sales). 
 
Waddington et al. (2017c) also use the J-value to examine the UK's response to 
Chernobyl of imposing restrictions on lamb produced on hill pastures in Cumbria, 
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.  The study endorses the Government's decision 
to remove the controls in 2012, but finds that the positive effect of the curbs had 
fallen to such a low level (equivalent to increasing the life expectancy of UK 
consumers by 8 seconds) by the time they were dropped as to call into question why 
the restrictions were not taken away much earlier. 
 
The caution displayed on hill sheep controls finds an echo in the approach of those 
regulating nuclear energy in the UK.  Nuttall et al. (2017) report on a structured 
discussion involving a panel of experts drawn from risk specialists, insurance 
specialists, lawyers concerned with nuclear law, and, in addition, safety and 
environmental regulators.  The authors contrast the "stoicism" of those closest to 
implementing policies and procedures to counter nuclear risks with the greater sense 
of uncertainty evident amongst those charged with regulating nuclear energy. 
 
While the loss of life expectancy for an exposed population may be rather small after 
a big nuclear accident, as noted above, what about those people, fortunately few in 
number, who actually contract a fatal, radiation-induced cancer?  How much life will 
they lose?  These are the questions addressed in Thomas (2017b).  Based on the 
model for mortality period devised by Lord Marshall of Goring in the 1980s and the 
linear, no-threshold model for radiation risk endorsed by the International Committee 
for Radiological Protection (ICRP), he finds that the average radiation cancer victim 
will live into his/her 7
th
 or 8
th
 decade and lose between 8 and 22 years of life 
expectancy.  This implies that, on average, a UK citizen has twice as much or more to 
lose from being killed outright in a road or rail accident as opposed to dying as result 
of a radiation cancer induced at the same moment.  The author draws attention to the 
limitation this finding exposes in the thinking behind the one-size-fits-all "value of a 
prevented fatality" (VPF), currently used widely in the UK for cost-benefit analysis. 
 
The final paper (Thomas and Waddington, 2017) provides validation for the J-value 
method by using it to give the first theoretical explanation of the regular shape found 
in the Preston curve, which charts life expectancy at birth against GDP per head for 
all the nations of the world.  The paper also proposes the life expectancy ratio 
(population-average life expectancy divided by life expectancy at birth) as a measure 
of national development, predicting and then corroborating that its starting value for a 
very poor county will be ⅔, but that this figure will decrease towards ½ as the country 
progresses from undeveloped to highly developed.  The authors have also provided 
the first objective estimation of an important economic variable, the pure time 
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discount rate, used, for example, in Lord Stern's analysis of the economic effects of 
climate change and, in fact, key to its results. 
 
The results from the NREFS project presented here are based on a diverse set of 
methods but show a significant scientific and economic convergence on how best to 
respond to a big nuclear accident.  Although it was treated as the prime policy choice 
at both Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi, mass relocation emerges as unlikely to be 
a good policy option.  The NREFS papers indicate that indiscriminate implementation 
of relocation after a big nuclear accident in the future would very likely transgress the 
ICRP's fundamental "principle of justification", namely that any measure adopted 
should do more good than harm. 
 
It is understandable that decision makers react to socio-political pressures but it is 
very important that decision making takes place against the best available analysis of 
the impact of the actions to be undertaken, given the very considerable human and 
monetary consequences that result from over-reaction.  Quantitative analyses such as 
those considered above can provide a "baseline" for the guidance of those who need 
to judge the best course of action.  If a decision is taken that goes further than 
warranted by the results of the baseline analysis, decision makers should justify why 
resources are being employed significantly beyond what is cost beneficial. 
 
Philip Thomas 
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